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A New Approach to Review of NEPA Findings of No
Significant Impact
On New Year's Day, 1970, Congress recognized formally the need
for a unified national environmental policy by enacting the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 1 Congress enacted
NEPA in response to growing nationwide concern2 over increasing
environmental harm resulting from uncontrolled population growth,
high-density urbanization, rapid industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and unchecked technological advances. 3 The national policy embodied in the statute emphasized long-term environmental
awareness and the responsibility of present generations to future ones
for negative environmental consequences.4 On a more practical level,
NEPA elevated environmental concerns to a position of parity with
more traditional factors, particularly economic factors, in federal administrative decisionmaking. 5 In short, NEPA reflected the mood of
an environmentally enlightened nation and promised progressive
change. 6
The first sections of NEPA state its broad national policy goals. 7
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1982); see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1 (1973).
2. The enactment of NEPA capped a long period of national debate over the pervasiveness of
negative environmental effects of modern society's activities. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at
1.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). NEPA's legislative history concludes that "[t]he most
dangerous of all [the enemies of human survival] is man's own undirected technology." H.R.
REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2751, 2753.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a), (b){l) (1982).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332{2)(B); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of
Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982).
6. Initially, the federal agencies reacted sluggishly to NEPA. An early study found that
"despite legislation, administrative rules, and public pressure, little had changed in the decisionmaking and environmental practices of most federal agencies." D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER, CAN ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? vii (1979). While this situation has undoubtedly changed,
a subsequent study showed that many agencies were extremely slow in complying with NEPA's
directives. See N. ORLOFF, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS 39-43 (1978).
Furthermore, the general public becomes less concerned with environmental issues when
other public issues appear more pressing. One commentator noted in 1976 that "[c]urrent energy
problems and the economic crisis facing the nation [had] greatly reduced public enthusiasm for
environmental constraints upon constructive economic activity." Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View ofIntent and Practice, 16 NAT. REsoURCES J. 243, 260
(1976). The lower visibility today of the environmental crises that triggered the environmental
movement in the 1970s suggests that the general public's concern with environmental problems
has not returned to its former level. See Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History
ofthe Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVTL. L. 455, 45558 (1985).
7. The statute establishes six goals for the nation: (1) to act as "trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;" (2) to assure "safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;" (3) to "attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environ-
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The statute's bite, however, is the administrative reform 8 it promotes
through its "action-forcing" provisions, 9 which include the requirement that agencies prepare a detailed environmental impact statement
(EIS) for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment." 10 Under NEPA, the preparation and use of
an EIS requires several primary agency decisions. 11 The most imporment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;" (4) to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain •.. an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual
choice;" (5) to "achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;" and (6) to "enhance the quality of
renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources."
42 u.s.c. § 433l(b) (1982).
8. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at viii, where NEPA is described as "an administrative
reform statute." The environmental movement in the 1960s was aimed in part at administrative
agencies, which were "some of the worst offenders against the environment." D. MAZMANIAN &
J. NIENABER, supra note 6, at vii Qisting the Atomic Energy Commission, the Forest Service, the
Department ofTransportation, the Department oflnterior, and the Army Corps of Engineers as
examples). The danger of allowing federal agencies to consider environmental impacts of their
actions with unchecked discretion is noted in the legislative history of NEPA. See H.R. REP.
No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751,
2753-54.
9. The term "action-forcing" was used in the legislative history, 115 CONG. REc. 19,008,
19,010 (1969), and has been adopted by commentators. See, e.g., F • .ANDERSON, supra note 1, at
2; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-35 (1982); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.l(a) (1986).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). An EIS is a statment analyzing in detail the environmental impacts of an agency action. The section states in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies,
regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible agency on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any
Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
In addition to the EIS requirement, NEPA requires agencies to apply a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach," including use of environment-related sciences, in taking action that may
affect the environment, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A); to develop procedures, with the assistance of the
Council on Environmental Quality, for complying with the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B); and,
whether or not an EIS is required, to consider alternatives to actions that involve "unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
11. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at viii. Three primary decisions have been identified.
The first decision is whether the agency action requires an EIS. The second concerns the content
and adequacy of an EIS. The third is whether to proceed with or forgo an action based on the
information the EIS reveals. See Peltz & Weinman, NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Framework ofAnalysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 71, 76 (1976) (identifying these decisions and suggesting
that each requires a different legal analysis).
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tant step in ensuring at least minimal compliance with NEPA's objectives is the threshold decision 12 whether the environmental impact of a
proposed action is potentially significant enough to warrant preparation of an EIS. 13 If the agency decides an EIS is necessary, it rigorously balances environmental considerations against each other and
against economic and social considerations, detailing its findings in an
extensive report - the EIS. 14 If the agency decides that an EIS is not
required, 15 NEPA essentially mandates no further consideration of environmental factors, and any significant environmental effects that
preparation of an EIS might have revealed remain unknown and unaddressed until they actually cause environmental harm. 16
Judicial review of agency interpretations of NEPA usually involves
an analysis of whether the agency has met the EIS requirement. 17 In
reviewing agency findings that the environmental impact of an action
is not significant enough to require an EIS, the federal courts have
developed different approaches. The conflict is one between the First,
Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, which review the threshold decision under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) 18 "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of review, 19 and the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, which employ a "reasonableness" standard.20 The
District of Columbia Circuit applies a modified "arbitrary and capricious" standard that employs a four-part test. 21
The development of both the reasonableness standard and the arbitrary and capricious standard in the various circuits has yielded review
12. An agency's decision to prepare or not to prepare an EIS is commonly called the "threshold decision" or "threshold determination."
13. An EIS may not be required for reasons other than insignificance of environmental impact. See the cases cited in note 53 infra for examples. Congress recognized that in certain cases
compliance with NEPA to "the fullest extent possible" would preclude preparation of an EIS.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2767, 2770.
14. The essential elements of an EIS are spelled out in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See
note 10 supra.
15. This decision is termed a "Finding of No Significant Impact" (FONSI). See note 38 infra
and accompanying text.
16. See text accompanying notes 102-07 infra for a discussion of different views on the likelihood of significant impact that should trigger preparation of an EIS.
17. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 275.
18. 5 u.s.c. §§ 701-06 (1982).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985);
River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756
F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1985); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); Foundation for N. Am. Wild
Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982); Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1973); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
21. See notes 114-19 infra and accompanying text.
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approaches that range from nearly total deference to the agency22 to
almost de novo review by the court. 23 The varying degree of judicial
deference given agency threshold decisions may well stem from conflicting application of several Supreme Court decisions and disagreement over whether to characterize the threshold decision as one of fact
or law. In addition, courts impose different burdens of proof on an
opponent of the agency decision.
This Note examines the confused array of judicial approaches for
reviewing agency findings of no significant environmental impact and
proposes a standardized, comprehensive approach that ensures compliance with both the procedural and substantive aspects of NEPA. 24
Part I reviews agency procedures mandated by NEPA which ensure
that agencies develop a detailed record for judicial scrutiny and constitute the legal basis against which to check agency threshold decisions.
Part II examines the conflicting approaches of the lower courts, emphasizing their reliance on Supreme Court decisions, their characterization of the threshold decision as legal or factual, and the burden of
proof each places on opponents of the agency decision.
Part III proposes an intermediate approach toward judicial review
that builds upon the District of Columbia Circuit's four-part inquiry.
The proposed approach avoids the confusing terminology (such as
"arbitrary and capricious" and "reasonableness") that characterizes
current review standards. Instead, it prompts courts to make an individual analysis of several interrelated parts of the threshold decision
and to adopt a moderate burden of proof for the decision's challengers.
The approach thus leads to a less deferential and more in-depth review, which this Note argues is appropriate given that agencies governed by NEPA frequently lack environmental expertise.

I.

NEPA PROCEDURES AND THE EIS REQUIREMENT

Congress intended NEPA to have substantive impact on adminis22. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,
828-29 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also Note, Threshold Determinations
Under Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA: The Case for "Reasonableness" as a Standard for Judicial
Review, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 107, 114-20 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521
F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th
Cir. 1973).
24. Although the Supreme Court has stated that NEPA's "mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural," see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), this Note argues that its substantive policy goals require
agencies to err in favor of preparation of an EIS when an agency determines that an action is
likely to, not that it necessarily will, have a significant environmental impact. See notes 128-30
infra and accompanying text; see also W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
750 (1977); cf. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting the
broad substantive objectives of NEPA in addition to its narrower procedural elements).
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trative decisionmaking. 25 Rather than requiring agencies to reach statutorily defined goals, however, Congress pursued agency reform
through procedural mandates. It recognized that procedures requiring serious consideration of environmental factors will, in some cases,
significantly influence administrative decisions. Because NEPA can
influence substantive agency decisions only through its procedural
mandates, strict agency adherence to those procedures is crucial.
NEPA procedures require preparation of an EIS for every major
federal action significantly26 affecting the quality of the human environment. Unlike most other organic statutes, 27 NEPA applies to all
federal agencies. Even development-oriented agencies such as the
Army Corps of Engineers are required to consider environmental concerns that may conflict with their primary objectives. 28 NEPA therefore further established the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ)29 to assist the various agencies in developing standardized procedures for complying with the EIS requirement. 30
To fulfill this directive, the CEQ has promulgated regulations 31
25. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation .... ");
see also R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE 137 (1976)
(noting that "[t]he effectiveness of NEPA ... must ultimately be measured not by the policies,
procedures, and organizational structures through which it is translated, but by its influence on
the substantive activities that are those organizations' outputs").
26. Although NEPA's language mandates the preparation of an EIS for every major federal
action significantly affecting the environment, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations promulgated under NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1986), and the vast majority of courts
stipulate that the term "major" has no meaning independent of the term "significantly." See
Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review ofEnvironmental Impact Statement Threshold Decisions,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.J. 63, 68-74 (1980). Thus, this Note treats the meaning of "significantly"
as the cornerstone of the NEPA threshold decision.
27. Organic statutes are statutes that establish a body such as a federal agency and the laws
governing it. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 990 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of "Organic Act").
28. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 104; W. RODGERS, supra note 24, at 698; Leventhal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 515 (1974).
For example, the Army Corps of Engineers, one of the oldest and busiest federal agencies, has as
its primary objective the building and maintenance of numerous public works projects such as
dams and navigational facilities. Often these objectives or the procedures to achieve them are in
direct conflict with environmental concerns. See generally D. MAZMANIAN & J. NIENABER,
supra note 6, at 8-12. See also Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 89 ("[A]gencies often become
carried away with their own abilities and defiantly refuse to comply with laws which they feel
might hinder their operation. They may seek to insulate themselves from the law and judicial
scrutiny, hiding behind the shield of expertise and a self-proclaimed autonomy.").
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982). The legislative history of NEPA reveals that Congress
realized that because the policies of different federal agencies often conflict with each other and
with the public interest, a central agency was needed. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 9lst Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2751, 2753-54.
30. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(2)(B) (1982).
31. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 (1986). Federal agencies are subject to both the CEQ regulations
and any procedures they develop internally for complying with NEPA. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. Part
230 (1986) (Army Corps of Engineers policy and procedures for implementing NEPA); 40
C.F.R. Part 6 (1986) (similar Environmental Protection Agency regulations). The agency procedures are typically based on the CEQ regulations, but are tailored more closely to the internal
operation of the agency. For example, while the CEQ regulations suggest generally that agencies
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that are binding on all federal agencies. 32 The CEQ procedures require agencies initially to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA),
a brief3 3 document containing sufficient evidence and analysis for the
agency to decide whether an EIS is required. 34 An agency can avoid
preparing an EA only if the agency has already "categorically excluded"35 the type of action proposed from those potentially requiring
an EIS, if the agency has already decided to prepare an EIS, 36 or if the
agency's organic legislation mandates procedures for consideration of
environmental factors that are "functional equivalents" of the EIS
process. 37 If,. after producing an EA, the agency decides an EIS is
unnecessary, it must state the reasons for that decision in a "finding of
no significant impact," a document commonly known as a FONSI.3 8
The CEQ regulations thus contemplate situations in which an
agency can legitimately terminate environmental inquiry because the
identify classes of actions that will typically either have or not have significant environmental
impact, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1986), an agency's internal procedures will usually give examples.
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230.6 (1986) (actions normally requiring an EIS); 33 C.F.R. § 230.7 (ac·
tions normally requiring an Environmental Assessment (EA), but not an EIS). But see N. OR·
LOFF, supra note 6, at 39-43 (many agencies have been slow in following or have failed to follow
CEQ directives).
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (1986). The CEQ regulations were initially in the form of nonbinding
guidelines, but were made binding by a Presidential Order requiring the CEQ to issue regulations
on NEPA procedures. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1236 (5th Cir. 1985); Founda·
tion on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Indian Youth Council v.
Watt, 664 F.2d 220, 225 (10th Cir. 1981). Even where its regulations have not been made bind·
ing, the "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference." Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979).
33. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 870 (1st Cir. 1985); 33 C.F.R. Part 230, App. B,
Para. 8.a. (1985) ("The EA shall be a brief document (should not normally exceed 15 pages)
primarily focusing on whether or not the entire project ... could have significant effects on the
environment ....").
34. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1986) (noting that the first
step in deciding whether or not to prepare an EIS is to determine if the proposed action qualifies
as a categorical exclusion). A categorical exclusion applies to categories of actions that an
agency has found not to have a significant effect on the environment, either individually or cumulatively. However, the CEQ regulations require agencies to provide for special cases in which a
normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986).
There are few cases dealing with the validity of categorical exclusions. For an example, see
City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1985) (categorical ex·
clusion of highway projects in general and exclusion of particular project upheld as not arbitrary
or capricious).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a) (1986).
37. Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 367 n.51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de11ied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For example, § 111 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982), has
been held to require the "functional equivalent" of an EIS. See Sierra Club v. Castle, 657 F.2d
298, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1986). Under the CEQ regulations, FONSis and EISs are both
considered environmental documents which are open to public and judicial scrutiny. See 40
C.F.R. § 1508.10 (1986); see also Leventhal, supra note 28, at 521 ("The courts have evolved a
requirement that an agency which believes an impact statement is unnecessary must give a state·
ment of its reasons.").
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EA it prepares supports a FONSI. Nonetheless, while an EA can provide support for a FONSI and a decision not to prepare an EIS, agencies should not attempt to substitute an EA for an EIS if indeed the
action is likely to have a significant impact. 39 Unlike an EIS, an EA
identifies the presence or absence of potential significant environmental impacts after engaging in only a minimal balancing of environmental, social, economic, and other factors. 40 By contrast, the EIS is a
much longer 41 document that studies environmental factors in greater
detail and includes extensive balancing of factors. Moreover, it focuses more extensively on alternatives to the action, 42 identifies "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources" 43 to a project,
and provides greater opportunity for comment from other agencies
and the public.44
In sum, an EIS and an EA supporting a FONSI convey to the
public significantly different messages. The EA, if it makes accurate
findings, suggests that the agency action is environmentally sound in
all respects, thereby justifying a relaxed view toward environmental
aspects of the action. The EIS, by contrast, acknowledges that the
action might result in environmental harm and thus establishes a basis
for ongoing environmental sensitivity. Furthermore, because an EIS
identifies latent environmental impacts and analyzes existing environ39. For an excellent discussion of the differences between EAs and EISs, see Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) (arguing that it is dangerous to treat an EA as if it were
an EIS because the two documents play different roles). See also Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d
1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985). But see River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of the United
States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) ("The
necessary judgments [in analyzing environmental impacts] are inherently subjective and normally can be made as reliably on the basis of an environmental assessment as on the basis of a[n]
... [EIS).").
40. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985).
41. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R § 1502.7 (1986), which states that EISs shall normally be less than
150 pages and that even unusually detailed EISs shall be less than 300 pages. But cf River Road
Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) (acknowledging an EIS of 858 pages plus two appendices).
42. NEPA mandates discussion of alternatives in both the EIS provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1982), and in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1982), which applies to all agency actions,
regardless of significant environmental impact, having "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." An EA may discuss alternatives, and in some cases an agency's
internal procedures for compliance with NEPA require such a discussion. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R.
Part 230, App. B, Para. 8.a. (1986) ("[T]he EA shall include a discussion of reasonable alternatives. However, when the EA confirms that the impact of the applicant's proposal is not significant, there are no 'unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resource [sic] .. .'
and the proposed action is a water dependent activity, the EA need not include a discussion on
alternatives ... .'').
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v) (1982).
44. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985). Although some outside advice is
envisioned under 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b), the comment period for an EA coupled with a FONSI is
limited to thirty days and, in some cases, is not required at all. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(2) (1986).
The outside input requirement for an EIS, on the other hand, involves a broad range of participants. See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 1503 (1986). Furthermore, the comment period for a draft
EIS is ninety days and for a final EIS thirty days. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (1986).
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mental impacts in much greater detail than an EA, it provides a
sounder basis for the exercise of agency discretion regarding the ultimate substantive decision to continue, modify, or even reject the proposed action.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE EIS THRESHOLD DECISION
In NEPA's early years, federal courts applied as many as five standards of revieW45 to agency decisions not to prepare an EIS. The reasonableness staµdard 46 and the arbitrary and capricious standard47 are
the only ones tliat have survived subsequent judicial refinements, and
the development of the respective standards has at times produced inconsistent variations. 48 Many courts, however, have simply concluded
that in practice the two standards are the same. 49
The difference among the circuits can best be characterized as a
dispute over the proper degree of deference due agency threshold decisions. This application of different degrees of deference reflects the
courts' fundamental disagreement over the strength of NEPA as an
administrative reform statute and on the willingness and ability of di45. See Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 82-86 (identifying applications of the arbitrary
and capricious standard, a substantial evidence test, a rational basis test, the reasonableness standard, and de novo review); Note, supra note 22, at 117-26 (identifying the same five standards).
46. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
48. For example, compare Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard and requiring the challenger to show a substantial
possibility of significant environmental impact), Providence Road Community Assn. v. EPA, 683
F.2d 80, 82 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard and distinguishing standards of review that require challengers to raise a substantial environmental issue),
and Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion v. Dole, 770 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying the reasonableness standard and requiring the challenger to raise a substantial environmental issue).
49. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 871 (1st Cir. 1985); River Road Alliance,
Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th
Cir. 1985); Boles v. Onton Dock, Inc., 659 F.2d 74, 75 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Judicial
Review ofAgency Action, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 884, 897 (1984) ("Courts would do better to state
their interpretation of the 'arbitrary and capricious' test in terms of simple 'reasonableness' and
avoid the temptation to recite the over-developed list of synonomous phrases.").
The Supreme Court has also suggested that the two standards are similar. See Baltimore Gas
& Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). The Court noted that the
courts' role "is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the
environmental impacts of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious." 462
U.S. at 97-98 (emphasis added). Later, the Court found that "(i]t is not unreasonable for the
Commission to counteract the uncertainties in postsealing releases by balancing them with an
overestimate ofpresealing releases." 462 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added). But cf. Gee v. Boyd, 471
U.S. 1058, 1060 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (The conflict among the
circuits "is not merely semantic or academic."); Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1237-38
(5th Cir. 1985) ("The reasonableness standard is clearly 'a more rigorous standard .•. than the
rule of arbitrary and capricious review that ordinarily governs agency actions.' . . . It is clear •••
that a court applying the reasonableness test may, in certain circumstances, receive and weigh
evidence beyond that in the administrative record.") (quoting Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081,
1084 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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verse federal agencies to comply adequately with NEPA's procedural
mandates. In justifying their positions, courts employ conflicting interpretations of relevant Supreme Court decisions · and disagree
whether to characterize the threshold decision as legal or factual. As a
result, the courts apply different burdens of proof to challengers of
agency FONSis.
The use of Supreme Court decisions is particularly unhelpful in
resolving the standard of review conflict. The Supreme Court has not
yet come close to examining in detail the issues surrounding the
threshold decision or heard persuasive arguments for adopting one approach over others. Similarly, the debate over the characterization of
the threshold decison as factual or legal is misdirected .because the
decision is concededly one involving both factual and legal elements. 50
Choosing one characterization over the other oversimplifies what
should be a careful and detailed judicial analysis. The burden of proof
issue is a critical starting point in review of FONSis that deserves a
more reasoned resolution than it presently receives. The next three
sections examine these factors in tum.
A. Disparate Interpretations of Supreme Court Decisions
Supreme Court cases interpreting NEPA primarily involve agency
decisions made in the course of preparing an EIS, 51 or an agency's
failure to consider environmental concerns when preparation of an
EIS was concededly not at issue. 52 Supreme Court cases that examine
the threshold decision not to prepare an EIS focus on whether the EIS
provisions of NEPA apply at all to the type of action involved, rather
than on the significance of the proposed action's environmental impact. 53 The Court has refused two opportunities to resolve the circuit
split over the proper standard of review of an agency's decision not to
prepare an EIS. 54 In spite of this silence, lower courts regularly have
50. See notes 87-101 infra and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87
(1983) (challenge of an EIS which was based on the assumption that permanent storage of certain nuclear waste would have no significant impact); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (challenge of an EIS for failure to
consider energy conservation as an alternative to nuclear energy).
52. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per
curiam) (agency failure to consider alternatives pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E), a requirement independent of the EIS requirement).
53. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981) (EIS not required for a naval facility capable of storing nuclear weapons because of national security reasons); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) (EIS not required for appropriations requests); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (regional EIS not required in
addition to comprehensive national EIS because the agency did not have· a regional program,
proposal or recommendation); Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn. of Okla., 426 U.S.
776 (1976) (EIS not required because of a conflict of statutory duty).
54. In order to resolve the split, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
would have granted certiorari in Gee v. Boyd, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985), noting that the
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relied on several Supreme Court decisions to support conflicting standards of review.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 55 is one Supreme Court
case often cited in the conflicting lower court decisions. Although
Overton Park did not involve NEPA, 56 courts have applied it to a
broad range of administrative actions, relying on its extensive discussion of the scope of review provisions in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 57 particularly the Court's construction of the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard. The Court in Overton Park established a broad category of actions that "must be set aside if the action
was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law' or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements." 58 The Court noted that under
the arbitrary and capricious standard the agency decision at issue is
entitled to a "presumption of regularity."59 However, it added that
"conflict is not merely semantic or academic." 471 U.S. at 1060. In Morningside Renewal
Council v. Atomic Energy Commn., cert. denied, 417 U.S. 951 (1974), Justice Douglas dissented
from the denial of certiorari, partly in recognition of the conflict between courts that applied the
arbitrary and capricious standard and those that applied the reasonableness standard.
55. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
56. Overton Park upheld a citizens group's challenge of the Secretary of Transportation's
failure to consider alternatives to the proposed route of a highway through a public park. Federal statutes prohibited the Secretary from issuing funds for a highway running through a public
park if a "feasible and prudent" alternative route existed. See 401 U.S. at 405.
The statute in Overton Park has been distinguished from NEPA. Judge Leventhal has noted
that
(w]hereas the statutory provision construed in Overton Park gives environmental values
dominant significance under certain circumstances, NEPA does not assign a relative weight
to environmental concerns and therefore leads the courts to recognize much broader governmental discretion in deciding whether or not those concerns should prevail in a given case.
Leventhal, supra note 28, at 520.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The section reads:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law·
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of
this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by
statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo
by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall
review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
58. 401 U.S. at 414.
59. 401 U.S. at 415. One commentator has noted that while many courts have read the
"presumption of regularity" language as signaling that the agency decision under review is sub·
stantively correct, the more probable meaning of the phrase is that the Court will presume that
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this presumption does not shield the decision from a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." 60 Without explaining this apparent ambiguity,
the Court then described the mechanics of review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. The initial inquiry is whether "on the facts
the [agency's] decision can reasonably be said" to be within the
agency's statutory range of choices. Second, the reviewing court must
find that the actual decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 61 a test which is
met if the decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and
was not a "clear error of judgment."62 Finally, the court must ensure
that the agency complied with procedural requirements. 63
The lower courts have drawn upon the ambiguous terminology
employed in Overton Park to support both a relatively deferential arbitrary and capricious standard64 and a more rigorous reasonableness
standard. 65 The use of Overton Park to support the arbitrary and capricious standard is fairly predictable given Overton Park's attempt to
define the standard explicitly. Courts applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, however, risk overreliance on agency discretion in a
context where the judicial check on agency action is particulary important. 66 More importantly, application of the arbitrary and capricious standard does not necessarily ensure systematic judicial review
of an agency's compliance with NEPA's procedures.
The more persuasive cases are those applying Overton Park to support the reasonableness standard. Some of these cases have determined that review of the threshold EIS decision is governed by the
first part of the Overton Park inquiry, which asks whether the decision
is "reasonably" within the range of choices the agency is allowed by
statute to make. 67 Others, apparently relying more on the second part
the agency acted within its delegated authority and require a challenger to the agency action to
assert more than unsupported allegations of error in order to prevail. See Stever, Deference to

Administrative Agencies in Federal Environmental, Health and Safety Litigation - Thoughts on
Varying Judicial Applications of the Rule, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 42-44 (1983).
60. 401 U.S. at 415.
61. 401 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
62. 401 U.S. at 416. The Court describes this standard as a narrow one that does not allow
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
63. 401 U.S. at 417.
64. See, e.g., City of Alexandria v. Federal Highway Admin., 756 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir.
1985); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973);
see also Shea, supra note 26, at 83, 100.
65. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.
1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973);
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986) ("[R]ealism about the danger of
abuse does not require a change in the [arbitrary and capricious] standard of review.").
67. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 & n.17 (8th Cir.
1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of the Overton Park test, have applied the reasonableness standard to
the type of discretion referred to in the "abuse of discretion" phrase of
the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing threshold EIS
decisions in light of NEPA's "mandatory requirements and high
standards. " 68
At least two circuits that apply the reasonableness standard to the
decision not to prepare an EIS rely on Overton Park to apply the less
rigorous arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's ultimate decision either to proceed with or to abandon an action based on a full
weighing of environmental considerations in an EIS. 69 These cases
treat the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS as potentially beyond
its statutory range of legally permissible choices - a decision measured by reasonableness - and the agency's ultimate decision on
whether to proceed with an action based on a completed EIS as one
deserving greater judicial deference. The absence of a thorough
weighing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors in an EA
and the possibility that significant impacts might become apparent
only after the completion of the detailed study involved in an EIS buttress the logic of applying these different tests to different agency decisions under NEPA. 7° Furthermore, the fact that Congress chose to
influence substantive agency choices by requiring agencies to follow
NEPA's procedures to the "fullest extent possible" 71 implies that
agency discretion regarding those procedures is much narrower than
agency discretion exercised after preparing an EIS. 72
Nonetheless, the vague term "reasonableness," while arguably ensuring that courts take an especially detailed look at threshold decisions under NEPA, fails to ensure that courts review agencies'
compliance with NEPA's specific procedural requirements. The common failure of the "reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious"
standards to ensure such compliance suggests that courts have given
inadequate attention to the final part of the Overton Park test, which
emphasizes judicial attention to procedural requirements. 73
More recently, courts using some version of the arbitrary and capricious standard have relied on the Supreme Court opinions in Kleppe
68. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973).
69. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.
1974); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
72. See Save Our Ten Acres, 472 F.2d at 466 (footnote omitted):
While the Court made it clear that the ultimate merit decision based upon a weighing of
these environmental considerations should be reviewed under the arbitrary, capricious, or
abuse of discretion standard, a thorough study of Overton Park teaches that a more penetrating inquiry is appropriate for court-testing the entry·way determination of whether all relevant factors should ever be considered by the agency.
73. See note 63 supra.
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v. Sierra Club 74 and Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council 75 Kleppe concerned the necessity of a regional EIS
when the Department of Interior had already prepared EISs for a national program authorizing coal leases and for several local mining
operations under the program. The Court held that NEPA did not
require the Department to prepare a regional EIS because the Department had no regional plan, recommendation, or proposal. 76 Proponents applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to threshold
decisions have relied on the Kleppe Court's statement that the agency's
discretion could be challenged successfully only upon a showing of
"arbitrary action." 7 7
The Kleppe review standard, however, cannot be extended to EIS
threshold decisions. None of the parties in Kleppe argued that the impact of coal mining in the region would be insignificant. The appropriate extent of agency discretion in the decision at issue in Kleppe whether to prepare two EISs - is clearly greater than agency discretion to forgo preparing an EIS altogether. The latter decision effectively prevents any detailed environmental inquiry while the former
merely concludes that one context for preparing an EIS is preferable
to another. 78
Similarly, Baltimore Gas has been advanced in support of the arbitrary and capricious standard. 79 In Baltimore Gas, opponents challenged the agency's decision to ignore uncertainties in the
environmental effects of nuclear waste storage. The agency assumed
that such storage would result in no release of radiation to the environment but conceded that if the zero-release assumption was wrong,
the environmental impacts would be significant. Nonetheless, the
agency decided that the possibility of radiation release was too uncertain to factor into individual licensing decisions. The decision states
broadly that the judicial role under NEPA is merely to ensure that
agencies give adequate consideration to environmental factors and that
74. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
75. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
76. 427 U.S. at 399.
77. 427 U.S. at 412. See Providence Road Community Assn. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 80, 82 (4th
Cir. 1982) (quoting Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 412); Shea, supra note 26, at 100 ("There is no discern·
able basis for distinguishing the decision to prepare a regional or comprehensive impact statement from more specific statements."); see also Aertsen v. Landrieu, 488 F. Supp. 314, 321 n.4
(D. Mass.), order affd., 631 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980) (suggesting that Kleppe might foreclose use of
the more stringent reasonableness standard, but applying that standard anyway in the absence of
a more explicit statement by the Court).
78. See 427 U.S. at 414-15 ("[T]here exists no proposal for regionwide action that could
require a regional impact statement .... ").
79. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In
that case, while adopting the seemingly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard, the court
nonetheless stated that "courts must play a cardinal role in the realization ofNEPA's mandate."
756 F.2d at 151.
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their decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. 80
Reliance on Baltimore Gas to support a deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard in the present context is not entirely appropriate.
First, the case does not involve a threshold decision. 81 Second, and
more significantly, the zero-release assumption was based on a set of
documents that, for all practical purposes, already amounted to an
EIS, 82 and thus the Court's review was more characteristic of review
of EIS-type balancing than of EA-type determination of significance.
In short, the Supreme Court's failure to enunciate the proper standard of review for threshold EIS decisions has left courts without
needed guidance in this area. The Court has established general principles recognizing that NEPA is essentially a procedural statute, 83 and
that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency in
reviewing NEPA decisions. 84 Similarly, the Court has stated that
courts cannot compel agencies to give environmental considerations
determinative weight85 or require procedures beyond those required
by NEPA86 in their overall decisionmaking. Yet, neither these principles nor the cases decided in related areas have provided lower courts
with a clear and workable standard for review. Instead, courts have
apparently manipulated the vague terminology of Supreme Court
cases resolving issues related to, but distinguishable from, the review
of threshold decisions to support their predetermined standards of
review.
B. Significant Impact: Question of Fact or Question of Law?

A court's choice to characterize the threshold decision as either
factual or legal influences the degree of deference it will apply to the
decision. Courts espousing the arbitrary and capricious standard tend
to characterize the decision as primarily factual, thus warranting
greater deference to agency discretion. Those following the reasonableness standard view the threshold decision as a legal one, warranting
more expanded judicial scrutiny on review. 87
80. 462 U.S. at 97-98.
81. The threshold decision is distinct from other types of decisions under NEPA. See note
44 supra and accompanying text.
82. See 462 U.S. at 99 n.12.
83. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
84. See 435 U.S. at 555; Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
85. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per
curiam).
86. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524, 528.
87. Compare Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[T]he APA standard permits effective judicial scrutiny of agency action and concommitantly [sic] permits the
agencies to have some leeway in applying the law to factual contexts in which they possess expertise."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), and River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of
United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The statutory concept of 'significant'
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The disagreement over characterization of the threshold decision
as a question of law or of fact is illustrated by two early interpretations
of NEPA. In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 88 business and residential members
of a Manhattan neighborhood sought to enjoin the construction of a
federal criminal detention center in the neighborhood until an EIS was
prepared. The Second Circuit identified in the threshold decision both
a question of law - the meaning of the term "significantly" - and a
question of fact - whether an action will have a significant impact. 89
Although the Court recognized the "possible availability" of a reasonableness standard to review the mixed question of law and fact, 90 it
relied on Overton Park, holding that the crucial, primarily factual determination of whether an action has a significant impact should be
reviewed under the less demanding APA arbitrary and capricious
standard. 91 Importantly, the Hanly court found that the arbitrary and
capricious standard "permits the agencies to have some leeway in applying the law to factual contexts in which they have expertise." 92
Similarly, other courts that apply this standard have been willing to
defer to the agency's "good faith judgment."93
In Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 94 on the other
hand, the Tenth Circuit held that because the EIS requirement is
stated in mandatory terms, its applicability involves an essentially
legal determination.95 In that case, an environmental group chalimpact has no determinate meaning, and to interpret it sensibly ... requires a comparison that is
also a prediction: whether the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement
are commensurate with the likely benefits from a more searching evaluation than an environmental assessment provides. The nature of the required judgment explains why we have held that an
agency's decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement will be set aside only if it is
an abuse of discretion."), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 1283 (1986), and Sierra Club v. United States
Dept. of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("If a finding of no significant impact is
made after analyzing the EA, then preparation of an EIS is unnecessary. An agency has broad
discretion in making this determination....")(citation omitted), with Foundation for N. Am.
Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 n.24 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We
believe that the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is primarily applicable to reviewing an
agency's discretionary decisions. The decision to prepare an EIS, however, is not committed to
the agency's discretion."), and Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244,
1249 (10th Cir. 1973) ("We are persuaded that the general reference to discretion in [the APA]
... does not apply here to the agency's determination under NEPA."), and Save Our Ten Acres
v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a
facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment
were too well shielded from impartial review.").
88. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
89. 471 F.2d at 828.
90. 471 F.2d at 829.
91. 471 F.2d at 829-30.
92. 471 F.2d at 829-30.
93. See, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn. v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
94. 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973) (applying the reasonableness standard).
95. 484 F.2d at 1248-49.
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lenged the Forest Service's decision to authorize a timber sale without
preparing an EIS. Unlike the Hanly court, the Wyoming Outdoor
Council court held that NEPA does not leave the decision to unlimited
agency discretion; instead, "the compass of the judgment to be made is
narrow." 96 The court concluded that the reasonableness standard it
chose to apply is consistent with the last phrase of the APA arbitrary
and capricious standard, which requires courts to overturn agency decisions not "in accordance with law." 97 The court stressed that "[t]he
sweep of NEPA is extremely broad."98
Ultimately, the disagreement over the proper characterization of
the threshold decision as a question of law or of fact is a pointless
debate, and of little importance to courts reviewing EIS threshold decisions since Hanly and Wyoming Outdoor Council 99 Legal scholars
have often noted that questions of law can be recharacterized to look
like questions of fact and vice versa. 100 Indeed, skeptics have concluded that courts usually characterize a decision as one of fact or law
only after deciding the appropriate degree of judicial intervention. 101
C. Burden of Proof Issues
In addition to the standard ofreview, courts have also disagreed on
the closely related issue of what burden of proof must be imposed on
the party challenging the agency decision not to prepare an EIS. 102
Specifically, courts have differed over whether a challenger must show
(1) that an action will have a significant impact; 103 (2) that a substantial possibility exists that the action will have a significant impact; 104 or
96. 484 F.2d at 1249.
97. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22, at 118.
98. 484 F.2d at 1249 (citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir.
1971)).
99. For a discussion of the disagreement among scholars, particularly Professors Davis and
Jaffe, see Note, supra note 22, at 114-17; Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative State·
ment, 53 B.U. L. REV. 879, 893 (1973).
.
100. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-47 (1965)
("[I)n many situations it is difficult, perhaps indeed impossible, to make a clean distinction between fact and Jaw; that the difference is one of degree, that the relation of fact and law can be
described as a spectrum with finding of fact shading imperceptibly into conclusion of Jaw.").
101. See, e.g., Peltz & Weinman, supra note 11, at 90 ("[l]t is naive to assume that courts
determine the proper scope based upon whether they find the issue involved to be legal or factual.
It is submitted that more often than not, courts attach the Jaw or fact label after they have
determined what scope of review to employ.") (emphasis in original).
102. The burden of proof issue has been addressed primarily by those jurisdictions employing
the reasonableness standard. For the earliest example of such a discussion, see Save Our Ten
Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d
868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1985) (discussing burden of proof but applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard).
103. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651-52 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated and remanded, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985).
104. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Cole-
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(3) that the action might have a significant impact. 105 Courts advocating the heaviest burden of proof fear manipulation of agencies by opponents of proposed actions. 106 Courts imposing an easier burden on
challengers cite the possibility that significant environmental impacts
may be revealed only after the preparation of a full-fledged EIS, and
add that agency opponents required to meet a high burden of proof
essentially would have to conduct their own EIS-type investigation to
succeed. 107
The courts have also differed as to whether a challenger's satisfaction of the burden of proof is sufficient to compel preparation of an
EIS 108 or whether it merely shifts the burden to the agency to prove
the reasonableness of its decision. 109 Finally, one court requires the
challenger to raise substantial issues not considered in the administrative record in order to satisfy the burden of proof, 110 essentially precluding review if the challenger merely attacks issues actually
considered by the agency in making its decision. Because these differences over the burden of proof can significantly effect the outcome of
challenges to agency FONSis, an attempt to resolve them is in order.
Ill.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO REVIEW
THRESHOLD DECISION

OF

THE EIS

The divergent approaches the federal courts have developed for review of EIS threshold decisions, although given the conclusory labels
"reasonableness" and "arbitrary and capricious," in fact range from a
narrow to a broad review. Any approach must incorporate existing
Supreme Court principles governing interpretation of NEPA. 111
However, because the cases the Court has decided involved situations
in which the agencies had already given environmental factors at least
some weight, those decisions do not provide sufficient guidance concerning review of the threshold decision. At the threshold stage, a
reviewing court should be concerned whether environmental concerns,
if they exist and are significant, will be given any weight at all beyond
man, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th
Cir. 1973).
105. See, e.g., Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d
1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982).
106. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 & n.9A (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973).
107. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975).
108. See, e.g., Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d
1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982).
109. See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1980). This approach,
however, raises the problem of post-hoc rationalizations. See notes 144-47 infra and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe, 621 F.2d at 271.
111. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
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the cursory treatment in an EA. 112
The key problem with almost every existing judicial approach is
the courts' insistence on using a single-step standard of review to scrutinize an agency's determination of environmental insignificance instead of examining the several decisions that make up the agency's
determination. A more consistent judicial approach would focus scrutiny on agency compliance with NEPA procedures leading to the
threshold decision, examining different points in the agency's analysis
in order to determine the overall acceptability of the agency's decision.
The four-part test developed by the District of Columbia Circuit provides a starting point for such an inquiry. 113
A.

The Test of the District of Columbia Circuit

The District of Columbia Circuit's approach to the review of an
agency's decision not to prepare an EIS involves a four-part inquiry.
First, the reviewing court must conclude that the agency took a "hard
look" at the problem generally and did not simply make bald conclusions.114 In part, this portion of the inquiry reiterates the need for an
adequate record, which is now also required by the CEQ regulations
112. See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Any decision based on an
environmental assessment is necessarily more speculative than one made after the preparation
and full consideration required by an impact statement.").
113. For the earliest enunciation of this test, see Judge Leventhal's opinion in Maryland·
Natl. Capital Park & Planning Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). In announcing the test, Judge Leventhal emphasized that "in cases involving genuine
issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold for impact
statements." 487 F.2d at 1040. Interestingly, Judge Leventhal did not purport to choose either
the reasonableness or the arbitrary and capricious standard, stating instead that the issue was
"whether the Postal Service 'unreasonably' or 'arbitrarily' failed to file an environmental impact
statement." 487 F.2d at 1035. Subsequent decisions in the circuit have used the test in conjunc·
tion with the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dept. of
Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718
F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983) (basically adopting the D.C. test for the Second Circuit, which ordina·
rily applies the arbitrary and capricious standard of review), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
114. Maryland-Nat/. Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040. The District of Columbia Circuit first
enunciated the "hard look" doctrine in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communica·
tions Commn., 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). The court
stated that
[i]ts supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in the case of procedural
inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the
court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has
not really taken a "hard look" at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in
reasoned decision-making. If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task, however,
the court exercises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on
its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards. • • . If satisfied
that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons and standards, the
court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path may be
reasonably discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency's
findings or reasons.
444 F.2d at 851 (footnotes omitted).
The "hard look" test was extended by the Supreme Court to decisions involving NEPA in
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is to insure that
the agency has taken a 'hard look' at the environmental consequences ••.. "). See also Baltimore
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and judicial precedent. 115 Second, the agency must have identified the
relevant areas of environmental concern, 116 a requirement inherent in
those decisions requiring a challenger to allege factors not considered
by the agency. 117 Third, the agency must make a "convincing case"
for its finding that factors it did consider will have no significant impact.118 Finally, the agency must show convincingly that any planned
modifications in the proposed action will reduce the significance of impacts below that compelling preparation of an EIS. 11 9
The major strength of this test is that by questioning different steps
in the agency's decision, it avoids substitution of the court's judgment
for that of the agency, while exposing flaws in the agency's consideration of environmental concerns. Its weakness is its reliance on the
vague "hard look" and "convincing case" tests. In the context of the
EIS threshold decision, the term "hard look" is misleading in that the
entire issue is whether the agency will indeed take the "hard look"
inherent in the preparation of an EIS. Furthermore, courts must have
a better sense of the most important points of inquiry in reviewing
agency FONSis if the "convincing case" test is to provide a uniform
basis for determining whether the agency has complied with NEPA's
procedural mandates. The following proposed approach incorporates
the strengths of the District of Columbia's test but provides a more
standardized method of review.

B. A Proposed Systematic Standard of Review
This proposed approach for review of EIS threshold decisions
identifies decisional factors that require heightened judicial scrutiny.
The approach calls for courts to scrutinize the distinction between the
EA and the EIS, the consistency of the agency's decision with other
decisions of that agency and other agencies, the agency's use of post
hoc rationalizations and proposed modifications, and the agency's
treatment of scientific controversy and public opposition. The approach intentionally avoids conclusory labels such as "reasonableness," "arbitrary and capricious," "hard look," and "convincing
case," and does not attempt to characterize the threshold decision as a
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 229 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
116. Maryland-Natl Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040.
117. See Winnebago Tribe v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th. Cir. 1980).
118. Maryland-Natl Capital Park, 487 F.2d at 1040; cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment....
[T]his inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful ...•").
119. 487 F.2d at 1040. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate role of project modifications as a justification for forgoing preparation of an EIS, see notes 148-52 infra and accompanying text.
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question of fact or of law. Instead, it focuses judicial attention on
agency compliance with NEPA's procedural mandates, 120 the key to
the statute's substantive impact.
Concededly, the test requires rigorous judicial analysis of agency
decisions and in that respect may be viewed as relatively nondeferential. A rigorous judicial analysis is 'favored by NEPA's mandatory
terms, 12 1 the EIS requirement's applicability to all agencies - including those without expertise in environmental matters 122 - the pretermission of further environmental inquiry occasioned by a FONS!, 123
NEPA's lack of precise language or legislative history, 124 and the perpetual tension between primary agency concerns and environmental
concerns in agency decisionmaking. 125 Furthermore, closer scrutiny
parallels the reasoning of those courts applying the first step in the
Overton Park analysis to the EIS threshold decision. 126
Various courts have given considerable weight to many of the factors incorporated in this approach. 127 Consistent testing of FONSis
against all of these factors would greatly improve the uniformity of
review in this area. The need for uniformity and the importance of a
judicial check on administrative discretion in FONSis call for judicial
resolution of the burden of proof issue as a starting point.
1. ·Burden of Proof of a Challenger to an Agency FONS/

The initial goal of the reviewing court should be to ensure that
those who challenge an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS
demonstrate that there is a substantial possibility that the proposed
action will significantly affect the environment. Since NEPA and the
CEQ regulations clearly contemplate situations not requiring EISs, 128
challengers should be required to show more than a mere possibility
that the action may have a significant impact; otherwise, an EIS will
120. Under the APA standards, the reviewing court is required to set aside agency decisions
made "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(0) (1982).
121. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th
Cir. 1973).
122. See F. ANDERSON, supra note l, at 104-05. But see River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps
ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283
(1986).
123. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985); see also City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); Comment, supra note 11, at 82.
124. See Note, supra note 22, at 115.
125. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 55-73 supra and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985) (proper distinction
between EA and EIS); 769 F.2d at 873 (agency's consultations with other agencies); Louisiana v.
Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985) (inconsistency with agency's prior decisions); Rucker
v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973) (public opposition distinguished from scientific
controversy).
128. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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almost always be required. On the other hand, given the possibility
that significant impacts might be revealed only after the detailed analysis an EIS entails, 129 the court should require less than a clear showing that the action will have a significant impact. Furthermore, courts
that require the challenger to address issues not considered in the administrative record, in addition to inadequate treatment of issues that
the agency did consider, should allow the challenger to rely on information both in and outside of the record. 130 The most sensible burden
of proof for the challenger, therefore, is to raise a substantial possibility, not yet considered or inadequately addressed by the agency, that
the action will have a significant impact on the environment.
2. Proper Distinction Between the EA and the EIS

The court should also ensure that the agency has not attempted to
substitute an EA for an EIS. 131 The critical factors in making this
determination are the length of the EA and the extent to which it
balances relevant factors. 132 A long EA that discusses environmental
concerns in detail should be considered highly suspect if used to support a FONS!, as it most likely indicates the existence of significant
impacts and thus the need for an EIS. Courts suggesting that a detailed EA is often a substitute for an EIS 133 ignore the fundamental
difference in the purposes of EAs and EISs. 134 A detailed EA should
129. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
130. Cf note 110 supra and accompanying text.
131. Recently, the Seventh Circuit sanctioned such a substitution in River Road Alliance,
Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 1283 (1986). The court interpreted the role of the EA to be to determine "whether there is
enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of
preparing an environmental impact statement," 764 F.2d at 449, and held that EAs are typically
thorough enough to allow the court to apply a higher threshold of significance before requiring
an agency to prepare an EIS. 764 F.2d at 451. Cf Maryland-Natl. Capital Park and Planning
Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[l]n cases involving genuine issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold
for impact statements ..•."). In River Road Alliance, Judge Posner noted "evidence in the
recent cases of a loosening of the judicial reins on agency decisions not to require environmental
impact statements." 764 F.2d at 450. However, while accepting the legal realism inherent in his
position - that courts today can allow an EA to do the work of an EIS because EAs are somehow more thorough today than in the past - Posner explicitly rejected consideration of the
"realism about the danger of abuse" that exists when nonenvironmental agencies are forced statutorily to consider environmental concerns "to the fullest extent possible" in making decisions.
See 764 F.2d at 449. For an opposite view on consideration of administrative resource allocation,
sees. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 75 (1984); Note, Does NEPA Require an Impact Statement on Inaction?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1337, 1368 (1983).
132. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F.2d
445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986).
134. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985); notes 33-44 supra and
accompanying text.
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be convertible into a sufficient EIS with little time and expense. 135
Furthermore, judicial refusal to allow EAs to substitute for EISs
would most likely reduce the time and expense of litigation that is
likely to result when EISs are not prepared in borderline cases.
Examination of the extent to which an EA balances factors is crucial in evaluating the validity of a FONS!. While an agency is free to
recognize social and economic factors that favor an action, those factors can never justify the decision to forgo an EIS. Only after preparation of an EIS can an agency determine that economic and social
factors outweigh significant environmental impacts and thereby justify
a decision to proceed with an action.
3.

Consistency with Other Decisions of the Agency

The court should allow challengers of the agency decision to present evidence that the agency required EISs for similar actions. If a
pattern of significant environmental effects from a certain type of action is apparent, 136 the court should then impose a burden of persuasion on the agency to support its atypical decision not to prepare an
EIS. A type of action that has never been considered by the agency
should also trigger more skeptical review. 137 Conversely, an action
that the agency has "categorically excluded," 138 in accordance with
the CEQ regulations and its own internal procedures, should trigger
greater deference to the agency's decision.

4.

Consistency with Advice of Other Agencies

The problem with relying on agency discretion is intensified when
the agency making the threshold EIS decision has primary concerns
that conflict with environmental concems. 139 Both NEPA and the
CEQ regulations thus contemplate interagency consultation prior to
making the threshold decision. 140 An agency decision that does not
135. See Marsh, 169 F.2d at 875.
136. See Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Corps of
Engineers' decision not to prepare an EIS for a shell·dredging project was inconsistent with its
prior decisions to prepare EISs for several other shell-dredging projects that produced fewer
shells); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1250 n.9 (10th Cir.
1973) (noting that the Forest Service had issued a directive to Regional Foresters requiring EISs
for timber sales similar to the one being challenged).
137. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(reviewing the National Institutes of Health's decision to approve the first deliberate release of
genetically engineered recombinant-DNA-containing organisms, and noting the court's role in
ensuring "that the bold words and vigorous spirit of NEPA are not .•• lost or misdirected in the
brisk frontiers of science"); cf 40 C.F.R. § l501.4(e)(2)(ii) (1986) (requiring agencies, before
deciding whether to prepare an EIS, to allow an extended public comment period for proposed
FONSis relating to actions "without precedent").
138. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982) ("Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has
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consider the advice of other agencies should be considered highly suspect, especially when a primarily nonenvironmental agency ignores
the advice of an agency with expertise in environmental matters. 141
As a corollary, courts should permit challengers of the agency decision to attack any administrative record that does not include any
references to advice obtained from environmental agencies. An
agency that fails to obtain such information contravenes clear mandates from NEPA, the CEQ regulations, and, often, the agency's own
regulations, 142 and thus commits a procedural error. 143
5. Post-hoc Rationalizations
Courts should be wary of an agency's use of "post-hoc rationalizations" to support a FONSI. 144 In the Overton Park decision, 145 the
Supreme Court found that litigation affidavits used by the agency to
explain its decision constituted an inadequate basis for review because
they were not a reliable reflection of the agency's decisionmaking process.146 One circuit relied on this part of Overton Park to hold that an
EA revised by an agency in response to a challenge of a decision not to
prepare an EIS amounts to a post-hoc rationalization that the reviewing court must view critically and without deference to the agency. 147
Such nondeferential treatment of post-hoc rationalizations is
proper because they are necessarily produced in an atmosphere of controversy which is likely to exacerbate any tension between the agency's
possible development-oriented motives and environmental concerns.
jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved."); 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1985) ("The agency shall involve environmental agencies, applicants, and
the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing assessments ... .");cf. 33 C.F.R. § 230.9(c)
(1986) (Corps of Engineers provision requiring EAs to include a list of agencies consulted during
preparation of the EA, but not specifying that other agencies must be consulted).
Although the requirement to consult other agencies appears in NEPA in the section describing actual preparation of an EIS, at least one court has applied it to EA preparation. See Sierra
Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 873 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d
822 (9th Cir. 1986) (Corps of Engineers decision not to prepare an EIS upheld; court notes
approval of environmental agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Fish
and Wildlife Service).
141. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 868 (1st Cir. 1985); River Road Alliance, Inc.
v. Corps ofEngrs. of United States Army, 764 F,2d 445, 458 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wood, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1283 (1986); see also W. RODGERS, supra note 24, at 753.
142. See note 140 supra.
143. At least one court would remand cases involving procedural errors in the agency's determination of no significant impact. In cases in which the court determines that the action may
have a significant impact, the court would require the agency to prepare an EIS. See Fritiofson v.
Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985).
144. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
145. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
146. 401 U.S. at 419. The Court cited Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 167-69 (1962) (courts may not accept an agency's rationale in litigation if that rationale was
not evinced in the official explanation of the agency's action).
147. Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th, Cir. 1985).
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Thus, the court must ensure that agency explanations given subsequent to an opponent's challenge were developed through proper reinspection of the relevant factors, such as by obtaining external advice,
and not through adaptative reiteration of flawed reasoning.

6. Modifications
The courts have been unclear concerning the weight to give to
planned project modifications that purport to reduce environmental
impacts below the degree of significance triggering an EIS. 148 While
the apparent consensus is that modifications should be able to support
a decision not to prepare an EIS, 149 most courts have established that
the mere promise that a modification will mitigate environmental impact is insufficient. 150 Otherwise, there is too great a possibility that
the agency may subsequently alter the proposed modifications so that
the significance of environmental impacts increases, and therefore that
agencies could use possible mitigation measures as an excuse for
sidestepping the EIS requirement. 151 In order to weigh modifications
properly, a reviewing court should require that the agency be legally
bound to carry out modifications reducing the significance of the action's environmental impact.152
7.

Treatment of Controversy

Courts have disagreed over the proper treatment of scientific controvery about and public opposition to proposed actions. Both the
CEQ regulations 15 3 and several internal agency procedures 154 identify
"controversy" as one factor in determining the environmental signifi148. Compare Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 987 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[S]o long as significant measures are undertaken to 'mitigate the project's effects,' they
need not completely compensate for adverse environmental impacts.'') (emphasis in original), with
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[M]odifications may
make the preparation of an EIS unnecessary, [but they] must be more than vague statements of
good intentions.").
149. See Leventhal, supra note 28, at 524; Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's
National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,038 (1981) [hereinafter

Forty Most Asked Questions].
150. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 877 (1st Cir. 1985); Preservation Coalition, Inc.
v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. See Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 149, at 18,038.
152. The CEQ has stated explicitly that agencies may rely on project modifications to make
FONSis "only if they are imposed by statute or regulation, or submitted by an applicant or
agency as part of the original proposal.'' Forty Most Asked Questions, supra note 149, at 18,038.
Thus, in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986), the court upheld a Corps of
Engineers after-the-fact permit allowing a developer to fill a wetland where the permit was conditioned on a mitigation agreement requiring the developer to purchase substitute land and convert
it to wetlands. But see Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir.
1982) ("The 'Forty Questions' publication ... is merely an informal statement, not a regulation,
and we do not find it to be persuasive authority.").
153. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (1986).
154. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 230.4 (1986) (Corps of Engineers regulations incorporating the
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cance of an action but fail to define the term adequately. Some courts,
however, have made a sensible distinction between opposition and
controversy. 155 According to these courts, opposition alone should
not be sufficient cause for overturning or remanding a FONS! if the
scientific community is in relative agreement over the potential effects
of an action. 156 By contrast, these courts define controversy as existing when reasoned theories on the environmental impact of an action conflict. 157 In that case, courts should require the agency to make
a stronger showing that an EIS is not needed to resolve the conflict.
The rationale for distinguishing opposition from controversy is
that allowing public opposition alone to force agencies to prepare EISs
surrenders the threshold decision to agency opponents. For example,
courts should not require agencies to bend to opposition based on factors that are not legitimate subjects of the NEPA review process. 158
On the other hand, substantial disputes in the scientific community
over the environmental impacts of an action logically indicate the need
for more detailed study in an EIS.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the context of the decision to .forgo an EIS, "abuse of discretion" must be considered a flexible term, given that federal agencies
with diverse and sometimes environmentally insensitive objectives are
all subject to the same requirement to consider environmental factors
CEQ definitions by reference); 40 C.F.R. § 6.509(b) (1986) (Environmental Protection Agency
regulations).
155. See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986-87 (9th Cir.
1985) (distinguishing Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681
F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982), in which the court referred to "numerous reponses from conservationists, biologists, and other knowledgeable individuals, all highly critical of the EA and all disputing the EA 's conclusion," from the situation in which "virtual agreement exists among local,
state, and federal government officials, private parties, and local environmentalists.") (emphasis
in original); Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1973) (public controversy is only an
important factor "where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, nature or effect of the major
federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a use."); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); see also Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 609 F.2d 342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979) (public
opposition based on socio-economic factors alone not enough to warrant preparation of an EIS),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). But cf. J. HEER & D. HAGERTY, ENVIRONMENTAL AssESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS 111-12 (1977) ("When in doubt as to the applicability of NEPA to a
particular action which has been challenged by a citizen's environmental group, the courts appear to have taken the attitude that if doubt does exist or if public opposition is significant, an
impact statement should be prepared.").
156. See note 155 supra.
157. Courts sometimes express their unwillingness to rule on the "relative merits of competing scientific opinion." See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dept. ofTransp., 753 F.2d 120, 129
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). In the context of the threshold decision, however, a court does not necessarily choose between competing technical positions by requiring further detailed study.
158. See Como-Falcon Community Coalition, Ii;ic. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 609 F.2d
342, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980).
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in decisionmaking. The NEPA threshold decision is particularly susceptible to agency abuse because many federal agencies have primary
development-oriented concerns inherently at odds with environmental
considerations. Furthermore, because NEPA is designed to influence
substantive agency decisions through procedural mandates, the judicial role in reviewing agency decisions to cut short those procedures
must be especially rigorous.
A careful review of the different approaches for reviewing agency
decisions not to prepare an EIS reveals that both the reasonableness
and the arbitary and capricious standards fail to provide a consistent
approach for reviewing FONSis. The goal in enunciating a proper
standard should be to identify crucial points of inquiry for determining
the appropriate degree of deference a court should give an agency determination that an action will have no significant impact. This Note
outlines an approach that achieves that goal.
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